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The architect Daniel Libeskind has written a noted lecture, “Traces of the Unborn.”  
We might add, “Traces of the Stillborn.”  There is a tendency in historical 
institutionalism (HI) to concentrate on the retrieval of traces of paths taken rather than 
(1) to consider the processes involved in the selection of paths; and (2) to reflect upon 
the conditions of institutional emergence and sedimentation of paths, whether taken or 
untaken.  Contrary to the path-dependency obsessed historical institutionalism of a 
Paul Pierson, this paper stresses the significance of historical case studies of 
institutional emergence in the earlier 20th century and their diremptive role within an 
unfolding genealogy of knowledge--what Foucault referred to as “effective 
history/critical history.”  A more critically oriented historical institutionalism journeys 
into the interior of institutions beyond “interestedness” toward “committedness,” 
toward the endogenous emergence of the argumentative logic of a mode of 
legitimation. 
 
The traces of the not yet or not fully born reveal the case of the law creating capacity 
of autonomous collective associations.  They shape their own autonomous domains 
heteronomously, institutionalizing collective rationalities - -institutionally separated, 
but recursively and complementarily connected to each other within a network.  Such 
institutional emergence in practice reflects liberalism’s inability to grasp the 
constitutive quality of collective life first provoked at the beginning of the 20th 
century by organized/monopoly capital, and today under the compression of 
globalized capital.  How does liberalism cope with pluralism?  How does it do so 
beyond the legacy of premodern guild and collegial institutional forms? 
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I 
 
Post-liberal conceptions of governmentality, jurisprudence and institutional justice 
emerged capable of providing a new substantive institutional foundation for the new 
autonomous collective associations that transcended and surpassed the classical 
liberal values privileging private property.  These institutional conceptions 
supplemented traditional liberal ones, but also built in democratizing institutional 
practices within the governance autonomous collective associations. Beyond private 
law welfare jurisprudence, emerged the governance of social law in the 
experimentation of the Weimar Republic. 
 
Conventional American and British political science have long taught us of the viral 
shades represented in Weimar Republic efforts at democracy.  Any remnants of 
ghosts of Weimar needed to be exorcised in the building of modern industrial 
democracy.  However, in the past years, English-speaking audiences have been 
reawakened to those Weimar efforts by histories of political and legal thoughts of the 
likes of Franz Neumann and Hermann Heller.  These have been provided by Bill 
Scheuerman, David Dyzenhaus and Peter Caldwell.  These historical retrievals 
suggest an immanent tradition of social law and social rights associated with the 
struggle to develop labor law, complementary institutions of collective bargaining, 
and institutional guarantees regarding education, the family, health, work and 
codetermination.  In an epoch of NeoLiberal undermining of the institutions 
democratic movements constituted, should these Weimar efforts at creative 
constructivist and reflexive jurisprudence be exorcised?  Or rather adjured to as an act 
of  recommitment?  Can these Weimar traces of the commitment to the governance of 
social law and social rights be seen as traces of the not yet born, rather than of the 
stillborn? 
 
Peter Caldwell notes, in his critique of Scheuerman, that the term Social Rechtsstaat 
(Sozialer Rechtsstaat) was a term used by Hermann Heller; and that it is best 
translated into English as the Rule of Social Law--or the Governance of Social Law--
rather than the “Social Rule of Law” State.  Further, beyond the inter-individual 
prerogative contract of laissez-faire liberalism, social law covers the collective 
constitutive contract based on multipartite consultations, bargaining and negotiation--
one which established a scheme of internal governance and autonomous moral/power 
resources, as well as a capacity for collective action. 
 
This trace of the stillborn was generated out of the violent class struggles of mutinous 
sailors’ councils outside Kiel in 1918 as well as workers’ councils springing up in 
Berlin.  Out of these violent struggles, the jurist Hugo Preuss inserted key clauses on 
social rights, works councils.  Labor law and self-constituting social law into the 
Weimar Republic Constitution.   
 
At the end of October 1918, sensing the First World War was lost, sailors of the 
German High Sea Fleet refused to obey orders to sail against the British Fleet.  Their 
revolutionary insurbordination caught fire.  By 4 November, rioting sailors took 
control of Kiel and together with dockers formed an Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council 
with revolutionary powers.  By 7 November, the whole fleet joined the Council 
Movement. 
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On the 10th of November 1918 - - a day after the Kaiser’s abdication and the end of 
imperial rule, a day before the Armistice - - the Berlin Workers’ and Soldiers’ 
Council meeting in the Busch Circus and acting as the representatives of all 
revolutionary workers and soldiers in the Reich, proclaimed a republican system of 
government.  Parliamentary socialist leaders like Friedrich Ebert and Philipp 
Schneidemann forestalled a proclamation of either a “socialist republic” or a “republic 
of councils.”  An Action Committee of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council was 
named to keep watch over the republican government.  Five days later, Hugo Stinnes, 
leader of the employers’ trade association, and Carl Legien, leader of the trade union 
confederation agreed to establish a “collectivist” system of labor-management 
arbitration committees, in which trade unions would be given full recognition.  The 
agreement was one of many seen as treaties of the organized versus Bolshevism, 
against a movement of workers’ councils (Rate) that challenged employer prerogative 
and sought a democratic restructuring of capitalism starting from the workplace, and 
extending throughout the society.  It was the time when a social democratic 
government had the power to decree extensive nationalization, to socialize the mode 
of production.   
In the months following, the future of Germany to a large extent lay in the hands of 
these conflicting political and industrial organizations of the labor movement.  
Starting in December, paramilitary groups in Berlin (e.g.) (The Free Corps) acting in 
behalf of the republican government engaged in bloody street battles with council 
supporters.   
As Charles S. Maier notes, in Reshaping Bourgeois Europe (1975) what would result 
was not a socialist recasting of politico-economic forces, but a corporatist one.  
Leaders of the traditional organizations of German labor, the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) and the trade unions, jealous of their newly won privileges, preferred to share 
their corporate influence with management representatives on parity committees to 
any sense of proletarian socializing power.  For six months these newly legitimated 
social partners sought to contain the unorthodox extra-parliamentary organization and 
methods of independent movement for direct workers’ representation. 
By January 1919, the extreme left-wing of the councils movement led the Spartacus 
rising for a Republic Council.  The revolt was crushed; Spartakist leaders Rosa 
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknicht were murdered by soldiers of the Free Corps.  As the 
workers’ and soldiers’ councils were being broken by the government and para-
military troops acting on orders of the SPD coalition, focus shifted to factory councils 
and workers’ chambers as transforming agents of workers’ control.  Such organs were 
intended to make workers participant in the overseeing and planning of production.  
An immanent tradition of social rights and social law was developed by what Claus 
Offe refers to as the “Lawyers Socialism” of Neumann and Heller.  This tradition and 
its advocates met the violent reaction of fascism.  Yet under the leadership of 
Neumann after 1945, the tradition was resurrected in the Bonn Republic Constitution.  
Today, the tradition confronts the violence of hegemonic NeoLiberalism as the 
Schroder Coalition Government attempts to maintain social rights and social law 
amidst the demographic and fiscal pressures of 21st century advanced industrial 
society that shapes the Berlin Republic. 
A focus on social law centers on the law creating capacity of autonomous collective 
associations.  They shape their own autonomous domains heteronomously, 
 4 
institutionalizing collective rationalities – institutionally separated, but recursively 
and complementarily connected to each other within a network.  Such institutional 
emergency in practice reflects liberalism’s inability to grasp the constitutive quality of 
collective life first provoked at the beginning of the 20th century by 
organized/monopoly capital, and today under the compression of globalized capital.  
How does liberalism cope with pluralism?  How does it do so beyond the legacy of 
premodern guild and collegial institutional forms? 
The genealogy of a German critical sociology of law associated with the governance 
of social law.  Institutions position subjects ideationally.  And the institutionalizing of 
socially accountable private law as well as of social law and social rights occur within 
an institutional context of the rule of law.  Unlike private property rights, these new 
institutional practices were the result of ongoing negotiated processes.  What 
Lehmbruch (1996, 1998) labels Negotiated Democracy  (Verhandlungsdemokratie). 
This focus is described somewhat by Oliver Gerstenberg in his recent 2001/2002 
articles – “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy:  An Institutional Idea for Europe?” (co-
authored with Charles Sabel) forthcoming in Academy of Law, XIth Session, Oxford 
Univ. Press; and “Denationalization and the Very Idea of Democratic 
Constitutionalism:  The Case of the European Community, “Ratio Juris, v. 14, n. 3 
2001 (298-325).  Gerstenberg in the latter (p. 320, fn. 21) cites Harold Laski and  
Georges Gurvitch  in the first half of the 20th century as parallel “social law” 
sociology with a focus on law “emergent” from a pluralism of groups – a tradition 
nodded at by Robert Dahl in his 1950-1990 work on the heteronomy of polyarchy, , 
i. e., how a pluralism of groups coordinated its democratically created policies 
without falling prey to the Michelsian “iron law of oligarchy.”  The focus is on 
autonomous subsystems of governance, the decentralized multiplicity of spontaneous 
communication processes. 
 
The legal theorist Guenther Teubner - who has followed his social law predecessors 
at the London School of Economics, Otto Kahn Freund and Lord Wedderburn – 
reflects to such a non-oligarchic horizontal coordination as “hetarchy.”  This 
amounts to a pluralization of deliberative democracy within the autonomous law-
making of a decentered society – either within national borders, or in the case of the 
European Union across borders.  Significantly, a good deal of focus on the 
governance of social law and polyarchy traditions are in present day European Union 
studies.  Gerstenberg associated the governance of social law tradition with nineteenth 
century syndicalism (Proudhon, Blanc, Pelletier) and its more functionalist/corporatist 
reinterpretation in the twentieth century (Durkheim,Gurvitch, Lehmbruch).  He tries 
to move beyond this tradition, associating it with corporatist blockages and oligarchic 
short-circuiting of grass roots democratic experimentation. 
 
Alongside the social law tradition, Gerstenberg describes Teubner’s 
polycontexturality approach as a systems theory approach to emergent “heterchical 
yet interconnected network-type linkage at the level of organizations and 
professions.”  This approach is seen as less functionalist and coordinated than 
corporatism, but Gerstenberg sees it as focusing more on a created circuitry of path-
dependency than on democratic path-shaping.  Teubner looks to a multiplicity of sub-
systemic subconstitutions, where private law is constitutionally constrained to take of 
its diverse social systemic context (hence polycontexturality). 
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Gerstenberg, along with Charles Sabel, eschew both corporatist functionalism and 
the autopoesis of sub-systems networking for the pragmatism of what they label grass 
roots democratic experimentation.  They focus – along with Archon Fung and 
Michael Dorf – on “bootstrapping” local autonomous deliberative democracy into a 
“horizontal” coordination and monitoring procedure that preserves an emphasis on 
citizen democratic deliberation both within the public sphere and private 
organizations. 
 
What all approaches share is a commitment to practices producing and reproducing 
more social egalitarianism, more participatory democracy within economic 
organizations and the workplace, and more of a pluralistic sensitivity to difference 
and the social byproducts and consequences of economic life.  And these 
commitments are understood as complementary to liberal notions of contract and 
property freedoms, but within a context of social choices and social responsibility. 
 
Franz Neumann (1900-1954) used the notion of “the governance of the rule of law” 
as the form to mediate the convergent genres of his two mentors, Otto von Gierke 
and his London School of Economics (LSE) tutor Harold Laski:  i.e. the Continental 
European traditions of Rechsstaat and Genossenschaft (fellowship associations) with 
the Anglo-Saxon tradition of “the rule of law.”  The concept of a social Rechtsstaat 
derives from the collective bargaining agreement’s overcoming the prerogative 
contract associated with the master/servant relation and establishing a framework of 
internal self-governance herein alternative norms other than the liberal institution of 
property are understood as supportive of autonomy.  It is distinct from the Liberal 
Rechtsstaat of Kant and Weber and the Social State of state-administered social 
benefits we come to identify with the Keynesian Welfare State.  As we have backed 
into a NeoLiberal Rechtsstaat notion these past two decades, the path left open is to 
once more explore the Social Rechtsstaat:  a relation of state and civil society assuring 
autonomous institution of self-critical governance for diverse domains, reflexively 
responsible both within institutional spheres and between institutional spheres.  This 
is the theoretical mission of the present day London School of Economics (LSE) 
troika of Anthony Giddens, Gunther Teubner and Ulrich Beck, and follows in a less 
skeptical Michelsian manner the pioneering sociology of Philip Selznick and SM. 
Lipset. 
 
The governance of social law is understandably a precondition for the rule of 
democratic law.  Social rights assure individual enjoyment of primordial liberal rights.  
The Social Rechtsstaat is more self-binding than the interventionist Sozial Staat (or 
Wohlfahrtstaat).  And it is an institutional precondition for actualizing the Democratic 
Rechtsstaat in modern (or late modern) capitalism.  See Figure 1 directly below. 
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FIGURE 1 
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A postliberal form such as the Social Rechtsstaat model is oriented to setting up 
institutions of moral discipline (i.e., governance) which can make us autonomous/self-
determining citizens enjoying basic rights.  They organize state/civil society relations 
into a coherent system of normative discourse of constitutive and regulative and 
institutionalizing practices.   
 
Rechtsstaat denotes law having rational and secular justification associated with a 
state or sovereign, as distinguished from premodern notions of traditional law, 
institutes of “organic” orders, or Natural Law.  Rechtsstaat is a continental European 
tradition and different from the Anglo-Saxon tradition of the “Rule of Law” 
associated with parliamentary supremacy and the genesis of law in the representatives 
of citizens.  Neumann used the term “governance of the rule of law” as the form 
mediating these two convergent genres.  And in his own attempts to deal with the 
pluralist implications of Gierke and his mentor at the London School of Economics 
Harold Laski, there is a fruitful tension in appreciating the extent to which phenomena 
called “state” or “sovereign” operates within a realm of legality, accountability, an 
independent judiciary, and a neutral and predictable set of procedures for applying the 
law.  Law cannot be normless nor cannot be formless.  The state is able through its 
sovereign to create and change the substance of the law.  At the same time, the 
societal sphere is protected against state intervention by (1) rights explicit or implicit 
constituted by human beings, (2) general norms and (3) the postulate of the 
“generality of law.”   
 
For Neumann, the governance of social law remained the unfinished project of the 
Rule of Law, the metaphysical functional equivalent of Natural Law, and the vital 
undercurrent in social democratic thinking latently present within the stronger statist 
and regulation-centured socialist mainstream.  It is historically more closely tied to 
the legal practices associated with syndicalism and the trade union movement than to 
the ideological or theoretical activities oriented toward political parties.  The 
generation of collective bargaining agreements, labor courts, and works communities 
are but a historical instance of the governance of social law.  Individual contract-
based law is challenged, and private property rights are adapted to “social ordering”  
- -  a constitutional ordering of the economy and society.  This is an institutionalizing 
discourse bent on actualizing the substance of social egalitarianism, and serving as 
corrective and alternative norms and forms vis-á-vis the liberal institutions of property 
are not the only ones than can support autonomy. 
 
The social law tradition and concept of Social Rechtsstaat captures best the approach 
of Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945).  Making use of the Genossenchaft theory of Otto 
Gierke, Sinzheimer challenged the “concession theory” of legal groups of German 
positive and Roman law.  Like Frederick Maitland, John Figgis, and Harold Laski in 
England, Sinzheimer argued that social groups are “organic entities, autonomously 
capable of willing and acting rather than legally fictitious personalities as they were 
understood under Roman law.  These authentic group personalities make their own 
rules - - what Gierke called “social law.”  Collective bargaining agreements fit this 
new category.  Gierke’s theory meant that labor unions as well as employer 
associations were legitimate groups with rights and duties.  These groups could speak 
through their own organs in ways determined by their own internal rules, that is, their 
own social law takes legal priority over the simple individual labor contract.  Beyond 
the inter-individual prerogative contract of laissez-faire liberalism, social law covers 
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the collective constitutive contract based on multipartite consultations, bargaining and 
negotiation - - one which established a scheme of internal governance and 
autonomous moral/power resources, as well as a capacity for collective actions. 
 
This Weimar generated critical sociology of law tradition speaks to an American New 
Deal context wherein legislation like the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National 
Labor Relations Act, and the Social Security Act were written in the language of 
private law norms.  Such legislation was constituted in terms of a sense of 
entrepreneurial individuals’ respective responsibilities, rather than in terms of the 
political economy of social citizenship connected to Continental European and 
Skandinavian welfare states.  
 
 A neglect of this key difference often blocks the English-speaking from 
understanding the sensibilities of European social democracy.  It is ironic that the 
perceived failures of New Deal generated social rights - - one tied to a private law 
welfare jurisprudence rather than to some sense of the governance of social law have 
been at the heart of the neoliberal assertion in the USA and Britain of market rights to 
choose, and the neoliberal emphasis on personal responsibility and initiative. 
 
 
II 
 
The interest group approach of comparative political sociology in the 1950s and 
1960s (Truman, Almond, Latham, Bendix, Coser, Dahrendorf) made no effort to 
examine either the objective material conditions or the already regulated or 
intersubjectively constituting normative conditions relating to the formation of 
interest groups themselves.  Stanley Rothman noted four decades ago (1960; 25) what 
we want to know, and where David Truman does not help us at all, is why the content 
of the political culture that these groups transmit assumes certain forms at certain 
times and not at others. 
 
The interest group approach was effectively challenged at the dawn of the 1970s by 
the social movement literature of Alain Touraine, Cornelius Castoriadis and Claus 
Offe - - specifically on the very process of interest group formation and the creation 
of new norms and values.  Institutions are understood as playing a mediating role as 
mechanisms for regulating conflict - - “mechanisms for arriving at decisions, the 
application of which is sanctioned by legitimate authority.” (Touraine, 1977:  178-79; 
cf Offe    : 54.)  This implies that there are operative norms prior to politics, learned 
legitimations - - so that “all claims are not negotiable” (Offe 1976 : 43).  Touraine 
(1977: 196) anticipates historical institutionalism by denoting how social action is 
circumscribed by a defined and particular historical context - - one that orients the 
field of social relations as well as the stakes in every kind of conflict or negotiation. 
 
The nature of path dependency is heavily influenced by the operative norms set by 
politically active members of the society - - i.e., an elite.  But Touraine and 
Castoriadis pointed to the differing and contradictory role expectations at work in any 
instituted configuration - - and that these differences and contradictions do not simply 
originate in the operative norms themselves.  Discursive traces of alternative 
institutionalizing practices are always at work.  And these, Touraine notes (362,311) 
“overflow the frame in which they appear” and “mobilize demands which cannot be 
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entirely satisfied” within the interior arc of subject positions within a preconfigured 
regime and its frame of practical reasoning and learning. 
 
Beyond Isaac Balbus’s notion of latent groups and class determinism, there is another 
approaching and veering off from Truman.  This is now less in terms of class 
determinism or epochal/regime periodization - - as in the Regulation Theory approach 
(Boyer, Aglietta, Lipietz) - - and possibly more in terms of a transformative 
discursive modality detectable within the normative categorials of a predicate logic.  
Beyond Truman’s discussion of potential groups, we can focus on potential norms, 
emergent institutions. 
 
Beyond the 1970s turning to latent groups, social movements and structured 
inequality came respectively an institutionalist and a discursive turn, as political 
sociology focused more and more on normative commitment.  As Douglas North 
noted (1990) institutions were increasingly seen as the missing element in 
comprehending the normative framework of cooperative and competitive 
relationships.  
 
 For the “new institutionalism”of  DiMaggio and Powell (1991 :11), institutions were 
seen as establishing the very criteria by which people discover their preferences.  
Institutions were increasingly seen as constitutive of preference-formation, and not 
just as strategic environments within which actors pursue exogenously-given interests.  
Much of the new institutionalism was to become preoccupied with a cognitive 
bedrock of shared normative constructions - - templates and constructionism became 
the hegemonic buzzwords. 
 
The turn toward normative commitment and normative regulation served to 
counteract the emphasis on interest aggregation; and - - as Joseph Heath in 
Communicative Action and Rational Choice (2001: 309) notes - - “to counteract the 
general tendency of human affairs to go very badly when left to self-interest.”  
Legitimation was understood in the communications theory of Habermas as the 
“warranted assertions of substantive rationality” eschewed by Weber’s rationalization 
theory; and bracketed by Mannheim in Ideology and Utopia not as ideational 
constructions constitutive of knowledge, but as superstructural illusions materially 
produced and periodized.  Critical here is the constructionist reprise of the Sociology 
of Knowledge approach of Berger and Luckmann as well as of Mannheim.  
Habermas’ ongoing project pushed us to recognize how we are socialized to develop a 
higher disposition in our practical reasoning, one that enable us to assign normative 
reasons priority over the institutional ones .  One that enables us to appreciate how we 
can distill underlying norms from the institutional context, from their experience as 
practices.  And in doing so, how to boil off the normative predicate logic of a 
substantive rationality.   
 
We are unbracketing legitimation forms that Berger and Luckmann as well as 
Mannheim treat sociologically without considering their ontological and 
epistemological claims.  Legitimations,  represent the substance by which our 
preferences are ordered.  And Habermas’s legitimation theory involves taking up 
“warranted assertions” with their “sense of appropriateness” and attendant 
constitutive “application discourse” - - all of which are ultimately testable in the 
“transcendent discourse” of universalizability/generalizability.  (See Klaus Gunther, 
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1988).  Habermas’ legitimation theory breaks as well with rational choice 
institutionalism (RCI) and its preference-hierarchy, transaction cost minimizing 
behavior and utility calculi - - which Hall and Soskice (2000) might yield too much 
ground to.  RCI starts with preferences that are exogenous to a model where all 
factors are held constant.  Nothing is prior to individual utility calculi.  And 
institutions are understood as merely vehicles for respective utility maximizations.  
RCI cannot account for the social, only what is at base intentional - - only what is  
strategic pursuant to exogenously given interests.  Again, we return to the 
counterpoint - - the discursive approach to the substantive rationale of legitimating 
conduct, and its engagement of the instrumental rationale of strategy and preference.  
Crucial is the former’s focus on an internalist conception of legitimation.  (See 
Bernhard Peters, 1996).  The constellation of positions within a legitimating argument 
is internal to the argument itself.  It is an endogenous constellation of positions that a 
subject discursively takes in order to redeem normative commitments boiled-off in 
unbracketed form from their institutional husks.  (See Weinberger, 1991). 
 
The commitments - - i.e., justifications in discoursive theoretical terms - - make 
claims upon acting subjects.  They exist independently of the acting subjects.  Not just 
as a legacy or an institutional supply of justification, but as a trajectory with 
semblances and traces along an arc of subject positions.  This internalist trajectory is 
itself a contingent byproduct of accumulating social conflict and cooperation.  The 
trajectory and its arc - - which characterize the endogenous constellation of subject 
positions within normative argument - - moves us to an evaluation of possible 
normative alternatives. 
 
Thinking in terms of constellations, trajectories and arcs enable us to see how 
legitimating claims and strategies exist independently of actors and are drawn upon by 
actors.  As Andrew Sayer (2000a:34) reminds us, “(T)he political discourse exists as 
it is regardless of whether I study it and whatever I think of it.”  The dynamic of the 
constellation of discourse is something acting subjects internally (endogenously) 
participate in and constitute as they go along.  As Judith Butler notes, the constellation 
is constituted as we interrogate it.  Our contingent articulation involves less a 
functional playing of roles, and more of an authorial interpreting and infusing of roles 
with our instituting imaginary.  (See here Cornelius Castoriadis, 1987 and David 
Runciman, 1997).  The constellation comprises a predicate logic - - with warrant 
predicates and truth predicates; with assertoric claims and validity claims; and with 
application discourse and generalizability discourse.  (See Heath, 2001, and Gunther, 
1988).  Beyond Truman, the nature of our on-going willingness to “play by the rules” 
is subject to positioned criteria of warranted assertability.  These criteria, claims of 
rightness and their propositional content are reflexively reconstructable - - rationally 
reconstructable - - as Habermas labels this internal constellation of normative 
commitment and attendant argument.  They are rationally reconstructable as 
unfolding normativity.   
 
This is not just a bounded rationality of recombinatory elements, but an imaginative 
projecting of a growing rationality (Joas, 200A, 200b, 1993).  This is an imaginative 
projecting and reconstructing that enables us to recognize the new - - that is, the 
“novel” - - within an institutional trajectory.  It is also an explaining of (1) either 
institutional stability; or (2) how ideas about institutional change or transformation fit 
into a hermeneutical circle of argumentation and interpretation - - an endogenous 
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source of change within a constellation of discourse.  They do not merely fit within 
pre-existing institutions - - their tree-like roots, and their capillary growth of outcome 
paths.  “Ideas provide the point of mediation between actors and their environment”  
(Hay 2001: Chapter 5).  The subject actors’ point of access to their densely structured 
context is irreducibly ideational - - and discursive.  
 
 Jessop’s “strategic-relational approach” melds well with path dependency HI.  Within 
a given specific context, there is an unevenly distributed configuration of opportunity 
and constraint for subject actors.  And along with it a structural “strategic 
selectivity,” that is, only certain specific paths of strategic action are available, and 
only some of these are likely to be actualized in actors’ intentionality.  As in RCI, 
only some actors “read” the paths effectively - - but this is so as a result of there not 
being the perfect information assumption “all things being equal” in much 
neoclassical economics and rational choice theory.  Hay modifies Jessop, by stressing 
how actors without complete information need to interpret the world on the basis of a 
constellation of ideas in order to orient themselves strategically, to reflexively monitor 
both the context and consequences of their actions.  Thus there is as well a 
“discursive selectivity” derived not from material structure, but from the claims and 
frames yielded in an interrogation of the constellations of interpretation and 
argumentation that function as cognitive filters, embedded and growing within 
institutions - - that function as the language of a text, a narrative about structured 
material inequality, latent groups as well as normative commitment.  The claims and 
frames are yielded in the strategies which subject actors devise as a means to:  (1) 
realize their intentions upon a material context which favors (“selects”) certain 
strategies; and (2) accommodate their normative commitments in so doing.  This is 
not idealism, but an ideational accessing with both the material and normative 
context.  This is not the longings of desire or the imposition of cognition; rather, it is 
an engaging of the discursive with the material environment, not a dissolving. 
 
This is a relating of a theory of institutions to a theory of normative unfolding.  This is 
as a substantive theory and not merely a proceduralist formalism, not s an essentialist 
mythic/mystic narrative of some inherent national ordering.  Two decades of 
sympathetic critics - - such as  Klaus Hartmann, Ota Weinberger and Ottfried  
Hoffe -  - have urged Habermas to grasp the need for a theory of institutions which he 
could ground his discourse theory in - - as a theory of Institutional Normativism (IN). 
 
What historical institutional (HI) finds in the institutional trajectory of unfolding 
normativity and its arc of subject positions is not idealism but discursive selectivity - - 
one which remains in dialectical tension with the exogenous structural selectivity of 
material incentive and opportunity structures.  This results in a constant dialogic 
tension confronting the discursive theoretical terms of an HI modified by 
communications theory into a theory of legitimation we will call Critical 
Institutionalism (CI).  This is a dialogic tension with the strategic opportunism 
inherent in RCI and evolutionary institutional economics.  Habermas helps HI with its 
persistent troubles with ideas, the constellation of legitimating, and normative 
commitment.  On the other hand, HI poses a final “way out” to Habernas’s persistent 
and unnecessarily confining problem of equating strategy with ultimately utility-based 
technique and purely instrumental reasoning. 
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III 
 
“Critical Theory redeems past hope in the name of the future by revealing the as yet 
unrealized potentials of the present” (Benhabib, 1981: 58-59).  It asks to what extent 
sedimented and floating signifiers have not yet delivered on their promise of a 
substantive order.  Unlike the Sociology of Knowledge of Karl Mannheim or Berger 
and Luckmann, critical theory does not deny the immanent development and 
affirmation of changed and new forms - - changed and new conceptual mediations of 
social reality - -- as a process of knowledge driven by an inner dialectic, as an 
unfolding of categorial analysis whose immanent predicate logic provides the basis 
for critique. 
 
Critical Theory is a theory of legitimation as rational aspiration.  It uncovers and 
measures its utopian content - - the substance of the organizing principles embedded 
within its worldview (Weltanschaung), its mental model.  Critical Theory tests the 
warranted assertions and truth claims of legitimations inherent within an institutional 
legacy, an institutional trajectory, and the arc of an institution’s anticipated horizon 
(or constellation).  It is a form of self-reflective knowledge in itself.  (See Geuss, 
1981:  95, 88, 59).   
 
A theory of legitimation is grounded in actors’ valuation of what is right.  And the 
more ideational institutionalism we have posed reflects the tradition of 
institutionalism as institutional embodiment of normative substance, rather than the 
tradition of evolutionary institutional economics.  It is legitimated intersubjectivity as 
a substance with its own internal principles - - its own entelechies.  (See Massimo 
LaTorre, 1999). 
 
Historical institutionalism (HI) complemented by the theory of legitimation can 
account for this ideational foundation of institutions (Thelan).  Part of the gap in HI 
results from the fact that practicing political sociologists - - often by training - - 
skeptical or dismissive of the possibility of any rational grounding for unfolding 
normativity (Beetham). 
 
A substantive understanding of institutionalism is one that fills gaps, aporias (in both 
Derrida’s and Benhabib’s terms), and situations of undecidability with semblances 
(Adorno), iterable traces or spectral presences (Derrida).  And a Critical 
Institutionalism (CI) resulting from the grounding of Habermas’s brand of critical 
theory as discourse theory in a theory of institutions resists the gapless normativismof 
a Kelsen or a Langdell, it as well resists the equally positivist imprinting of the black 
letter law without recourse to Natural Law.  Note Figure 2 below, as adapted from 
Paulson (1992). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
LAW AND FACT 
 
 
LAW AND  
MORALITY 
SEPARABILITY OF 
LAW 
AND FACT 
INSEPARABILITY 
OF LAW AND FACT 
 
INSEPARABILITY OF 
LAW AND MORALITY 
1a 
NATURAL 
LAW  
THEORY 
Otto 
Gierke 
 
COMMUNI- 
CATIVE 
COMPETANCY 
THEORY 
Jurgen Habermas 
                 1b    
2       INSTITUTIONALIST 
THEORY OF LAW 
(law as institutional fact) 
Neil MacCormick 
&Ota Weinberger 
beyond Emile Durkheim 
 
 
SEPARABILITY OF 
LAWAND MORALITY 
3 
JURISPRUDENTIAL 
AUTONOMY 
Hans Kelsen’s Pure 
Nomological Theory of Law 
4 
EMPIRICO-POSITIVIST 
THEORY OF LAW 
John Austin 
& H.L.A. Hart 
 
 
 
 
 
In confronting the NeoLiberal challenge to all forms of sociality/solidarity, such a 
critical institutionalism would follow Richard Fallon in probing the inherent 
intelligibility within the fluidity of constructivist norm creation beyond the narrower 
interpretive mode of Richard Epstein and Antonin Scalia.  Substantive design by 
constituting interpretive communities displaces individualist formalized law. 
 
The CI developed here evaluates the forms by which societies evaluate themselves, 
that is, the formal ordering of what Ottfried Hoffe has referred to as “Institutional 
Justice.”  Hoffe understands a juridico-discursive order in the “discourse theoretical 
terms” of argumentative forms, rather than in an engagement with chimerical 
counterfactuals.  These argumentative forms serve as the vehicles by which we extend 
the institutionalizing dialogue of deliberative justification into the marketplace and 
civil law as governmentality - - governance rationales used in practices, rather than 
idealizations (chimera).  This involves discourses answering practical questions -  -
and with it a discursive selectivity testing for the dialogic claims of an unredeemed 
predicate logic, beyond the functional sociological compliance and justification of a 
strategic selectivity. 
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Critical institutionalism as a capstone to historical institutionalism (HI) can be 
understood as an internalist principled game, a language game 
 
• wherein norms rather than some mythic/mystic substance is experienced as 
Inner institutional morality (Hermann Heller), 
 
• wherein deliberation defines its own guiding norms and practices as an 
institutionalizing governance rationale (Jurgen Habermas), 
 
 
• wherein norms are not understood as objects of pure cognition, but as 
values we commit ourselves to in our practices:  (Georges Gurvitch); and 
 
• wherein norms emerge as the socially shared solutions to problems and as 
byproducts of repeated social conflicts - - from which they are transformed  
into a constellation of learned normative commitments, revealed as 
promises. 
(Jack Knight). 
 
Here the “institutional” represents the not-contractual dimension of obligation - - the 
shared standards of self-governance, and valuation, the normative commitments and 
promises of a “promising game (John Searle) constituted in and through discourse 
theoretical terms. 
 
Criticial institutionalism like the “critical history” posed by Michel Foucault and 
Mitchell Dean goes beyond posing critical junctures of contingent emergence. It 
involves a capacity to engage in interrogation of the internalist principled/promising 
game - - wherein discourse is ontologically prior to identity-formation, and legitimacy 
is prior to legality.  “No individual can choose to stand outside the totality of the 
interpretive frameworks of discourse written into our very human condition.”  (See 
A.M. Smith, 1998)  Institutional Justice involves the legitimated ordering of regimes  
- - substantively and procedurally - - in terms of formal models of law and political 
economy. 
 
Regimes are purposefully created normative frameworks organizing negotiations 
among a formally specified set of actors - - an institutional setting within which 
negotiations can take place, and both bonding and blind force can be assured.  A 
regime offers 
 
• a template of normative understandings’ 
 
• a specific mode of legal discourse corresponding to the logic of  
argumentative practices for fair negotiations based on discourse 
specific norms 
 
• a model of institutional justice; and 
 
• a utopian model for re-visioning practices.   
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A regime is an ensemble of constitutive discourse providing the imaginary framework 
through which we interpret the symbolic order into which we are drawn, if not 
thrown.  It is a carrier of institutionalizing practices and governance rationales.  And, 
as an internal ensemble of discourse generating both legitimation and truth claims, it 
is open to interpellation/interrogation.  And as Niklas Rose (1996:  60) has noted, it 
has been the Right rather than the Left that has managed to articulate a rationality of 
governance consonant with a new regime of the self.  To a large extent, the regime of 
social democracy, while competing rationality with liberalism, is grounded in a liberal 
base.  
 
Subject positions - - themselves constituted discursively - - are an ensemble of 
interpretative schema responsive to structural positions.  They are drawn upon as 
legitimating strategies and mark how we experience our structural position within the 
social.  ( Here see the development of this concept from Gramsci through Althusser 
through Laclau and Mouffe).  Thus we are not just bearers of supports, but actors who 
draw upon a repertoire of discourse resources - - within a discursive structure of 
signifiers - - interpretive schema, rights, claims and collective identities tied to subject 
positions.  We are actors who draw on legitimations of purposive and substantive 
argumentation. 
 
Subject position within respective regimes of law and political economy can be 
rationally reconstructed in discourse.  In doing so the internal relations of an 
immanent normative unfolding or a projected re-institutionalizing of practices can be 
gauged - - in the discourse theoretical terms of argumentative forms, i.e., discursive 
selectivity.  Subject positions are more in a condition of floating signifiers that have 
not yet delivered on its promises, on its normative commitments, on its reflected 
visions.  And moving along the interior arc of a regime’s subject positions, we move 
beyond the configurative paths, junctures and practices of “effective history” 
practiced by HI, toward a “critical history” associated with CI.  The latter employs 
more of a diremptive approach - - a key phrase from Habermas and ironically Georges 
Sorel before him.  The diremptive approach attempts to reflect reality at more than 
one moment, one instance. 
 
Legitimations are positioned in narratives and worldviews/world picture - - not as 
static snapshots, but as panning shots of a regime in motion - - with social movement, 
swelling beyond thresholds, and institutional emergence.  A diremptive approach 
scans a constellation of instances that open up to montage-like presentation 
 
• where genres return to haunt us not just as memory, but also as 
possibility of uncanny actualization; and 
 
• wherein the future is never either fully determinable or fathomable, but 
only grasped and recognized as traces or semblances - - moved by the 
necessity of truth, rather than the arbitrariness of ideology -  -within 
the gaps among the intermittent rhythms, sequences and jumpcuts. 
Critical instiutionalism (CI) complements historical institutionalism by keeping us 
aware that the swelling of historical movement and change is an instance of 
displacement, as much as it is path-dependent.  This is the displacement of one 
threshold for another.  History, Walter Benjamin advised us, is never wrapped into a 
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specific moment of a fixed juncture.  Rather, it flows in a passage that swells beyond 
the limits of its epoch, of its period.  It confronts a gap - - or aporia - - and makes up 
for it by constituting a canal for the displacement of the swelling (schwelle), a 
superimposition of a threshold. 
 
 
IV 
 
 
To what extent can liberalism offer a convincing account of the democratic 
citizenship adaptable to the provocation of non-statist institutions?  Following Laski 
rather than Schmitt, sovereignty in the past century reflects social compacts rather 
than separate state apparatuses per se.  A regime of the Autonomous Social uncoupled 
from the State and linked through complementary institutions within civil society is 
bent on institutionalizing itself as a form of life, as a postliberal governance rationale. 
 
Following Laski rather than Schmitt,we need to accommodate rather than exorcise a 
pluralism of heteronomous regulatives and constitutives.  Out of the accelerating 
pluralism of the past century, emerges a plan of signifiers in the practical and 
discursive struggles of pluralist Social Subjects of Rights rather than the Marxist 
monist Social Subject of Rights - - another sense of sovereignty eclipsed.  (See 
McClure:  1992,1996).  The Governance of Autonomous Social Law derives from 
deliberation as an effect - - as a discourse finds its own subjects.  Such pluralist 
deliberation is the source of its legitimation, rather than some higher law or some 
gapless system of norms.  This trace of a tradition of discourse associated with an 
emergent practice and juridification draws on the categorical framing of a democratic 
imaginary in its historical struggles and in its immanent potential.  (See Castoriadis). 
 
The promise of the signifiers of the Governance of Social Law have only partially 
delivered in their promise of a new institutional order.  As Adorno notes, the 
democratic imaginary seeks traces of a prospect of utopia within a society that 
continually betrays it, tracing its own claims which ghost the future. 
 
The practices and forms of the Governance of Social Law can be grasped 
categorically as assertional commitments (Brandon), and not counterfactually as 
chimera (G.A. Kelly).  Chimera are anti-historical.  The issue of immanent historical 
warrants - - rather than visions of order - - are immanent within the core of practices, 
immanent within a regime of discourse whose claims are interrogated/interpellated.  
This immanence is inherent in what George Hendrik von Wright would call a quasi-
teleology of normic statements - - that is, legitimating, propositional claims.  A 
Critical Institutionalism (CI) goes beyond the Sociology of Knowledge in 
unbracketing normative commitments from practices, from their institutional husks. 
 
Categorial form is created in historical time but attains independent validity as the 
argument behind an institutionalizing practice is interpellated and gauged.  Beyond 
the Sociology of Knowledge, Institutional Normativism (IN) starts with a 
genealogical study of the evolution of institutional practices as reworkable traces of 
affirmative substance, the substance of an emergent form of legitimation.  Then IN is 
transformed into CI in its interpellation of the legitimating argument itself, which 
guides the “imaginary institution of society.” 
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Beyond HI, and its focus on path dependency, Critical Theory as CI and “critical 
history” understands a process of self-clarification and emergent possibility internal to 
a historical process, internal to the argument of normative principles that are the core 
of institutional/institutionalizing subjects.  Following the anthropologist Mary 
Douglas in How Institutions Think (1986), institutions can be conceptualized as 
subjects of action, as bearer of practices and their normative claims/commitments.  A 
Critical Institutionalism looks beyond the “discursive selectivity” of some logic of 
appropriateness and the interestedness of actors’ application of that logic, what 
Schattschneider once called the “mobilization of bias.”  CI looks beyond 
“interestedness” toward “commitedness.”  In this way CI may have more in common 
with Philip Selznick’s “old institutionalism” with its focus on the affirmativity of 
institutional commitments as an ontology of institutional facts, rather than the focus of 
RCI on “contracting.” 
 
Beyond interestedness and discursive selectivity, we are moved to focus on discursive 
commitment itself rather than merely the application of the commitment.  We are 
moved to a theory of legitimation rather than of interest groups, to a commitedness to 
rights and procedures. 
 
Rational Reconstruction can be understood externally/explicitly as the process tracing 
of the contingent interaction, the discursive selectivity of policy-makers’ performance 
and claims within a path dependent institutional context. 
 
Rational Reconstruction can also be understood as a more internalist/implicit 
interpellation of the commitments themselves:  their warrants, their propositions, the 
arguments immanent within path shaping/institutionalizing practice “boiled off from 
their institutional husks.” 
 
 
Social Subjects of Rights are inscribed in material practice - - not as a system of ideas 
in people’s heads, but as material practices existing in people’s conduct according to 
their commitments.  These material practices can be understood not only in terms of 
an ordinary causal emergence reducible to micro-properties, and path dependency 
within predetermined paths of appropriateness.  These practices can also be 
conceptualized in terms of a novel path-shaping and holistic emergency wherein a set 
of properties (such as the Governance of Social Law) may be determined by and 
dependent on other properties, but not reducible to those others.  (See Joas, 1993, 
2000a, 2000b; Hasker, 1999: 171-78; Kim, 1993). 
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